Please substitute the attached comments for the comments originally submitted on behalf of MIPLA yesterday.
ignorance of other exculpatory facts, such as subsequently discovered information that the disclosure was, in fact, derived from an inventor or joint inventor. Insofar as any disclosure is work by an applicant, there is Federal Circuit precedent embraced by the MPEP that is important to note. Under MPEP 2129, the Office has cited Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co, with the relevant portion being bolded and underlined:
Admissions as Prior Art [R--6]
I. ADMISSIONS BY APPLICANT CONSTITUTE PRIOR ARTA statement by an applicant > in the specification or made < during prosecution identifying the work of another as "prior art" is an admission ** > which can be relied upon for both anticipation and obviousness determinations, regardless of whether the admitted prior art would otherwise qualify as prior art under the statutory categories of 35 [W] here the inventor continues to improve upon his own work product, his foundational work product should not, without a statutory basis, be treated as prior art solely because he admits knowledge of his own work. It is common sense that an inventor, regardless of an admission, has knowledge of his own work."). Consequently, the examiner must determine whether the subject matter identified as "prior art" is applicant's own work, or the work of another. In the absence of another credible explanation, examiners should treat such subject matter as the work of another.
MIPLA believes that the better approach is to treat an applicant admission as a rebuttable presumption that the referenced information is "prior art", and that the burden would then shift to the applicant to establish by evidence, not just attorney argument, that the referenced information is not, in fact, prior art under AIA Section 102(a). C. Use of "Subject Matter of the Disclosure" -MIPLA is concerned that the proposed Examination Guidelines adopt the language found in Rule 1.130 that introduces a new concept into the rules that is not recited in the statute or defined by the proposed Rule. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. at 43765, col. 3. As explained in the attached article, the statutory phrase "subject matter disclosed" is unique to AIA Section 102(b) and 102(c) and must be interpreted and applied consistently by the Office in promulgating rules relating to these statutory provisions. The phrase used in proposed Rule 1.130 "subject matter of the disclosure" is not found in the statute or defined in the NPR. The usage of this phrase in the proposed Examination Guidelines and proposed Rules does not appear to be consistent and is used in some places to refer to the content of the prior art disclosure and in other places to refer to the content of the disclosure made by or from the inventor that is being relied upon to trigger an exception under AIA Section 102(b) or 102(c). More problematic is that the phrase is also used in some places to reference the content of a rejection, instead of the content of either a prior art or inventor--based disclosure. The Office is urged to reconsider and revise the usage of the terminology in the final guidelines to make both the rules and the guidelines clear and consistent with respect to the meaning and application of the statutory language "subject matter disclosed." D.
Concern About Use of Named Authors as a Presumptive Surrogate for Identifying
Inventors -MIPLA is concerned that the proposed Examination Guidelines with respect to determining whether it is apparent that a potential prior art disclosure is by an inventor or joint inventor. 77 Fed. Reg. at 43766, col. 1. The proposed Examination Guidelines are problematic to the extent that the proposed guidelines assumes a disclosure is not by an inventor or joint inventor based solely on any differences between the named inventors on a patent application and named authors on a publication. It is much more common for a publication corresponding to the subject matter disclosed to have more authors listed then the number of inventors listed on a patent application. In this situation, however, the proposed Examination Guidelines call for the Office to issue a rejection based on the publication because the number of authors is greater than the number of inventors listed on the application. This does not reflect the real world differences between naming author and inventors. It also may encourage an over inclusive naming of inventors on patent applications until the claims are in condition for allowance, at which point a request to change the inventors could be made to narrow the inventors relative to the claimed subject matter that is been indicated as allowable. MIPLA believes that a better approach is to assume thata publication is not by or from the inventors if there are no inventors in common with any of the authors listed on the publication, and if there is some, but not complete, overlap between inventors and authors, to instruct the Examiner to evaluate the publication and use his or her best judgement on whether there may be reason to believe that the publication is not by or for the inventors and issue a provisional rejection which the applicant could then overcome by submission of further evidence in response to the reasons identified by the Examiner for concern about the applicability of the exceptions of AIA Section 102(b) to the publication in question.
E. Concerns about Translations of Foreign Priority Cases used as Prior Art under
Section 102(a)(2) -MIPLA has both questions and concerns about the proposed Examination Guidelines in terms of translations of foreign patent applications that may qualify as either priority documents or as prior art. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. at 43768, col. 2. The proposed Examination Guidelines make the distinction between actually being entitled to a priority claim to, or the benefit of, a prior--filed application, and merely being entitled to claim priority to, or the benefit of, a prior filed application. However, the proposed Examination Guidelines do not provide any guidance on how the Office will apply prior art that claims the benefit of a foreign application, but which may not be in the English language. Because the burden is on the Office to establish a proper basis for a AIA Section 102(a)(2) rejection, the guidelines should to establish that any priority document relied upon as prior art by the examiner must be shown to establish a prima facie rejection. To the extent possible, MIPLA suggests that the Office should utilize machine translations to identify support in a priority document that is being relied upon in support of a rejection. Applicant can then, in rebuttal, provide a certified translation to prove that a machine translation is inaccurate and that the purported support for a given rejection does not exist. proposed Examination Guidelines should provide more guidance on fact patterns not found in current case law, but that will need to be evaluated during the prosecution of AIA patent applications. 77 Fed. Reg. at 43763, col. 1. Specifically, the Office should consider providing guidance on the "permanence" issue in terms of online materials, e.g. how long does online material need to be online and how available in terms of searching and crawlers identifying links to the online materials, and whether passwords or other restricted access legends on online materials serve to disqualify the materials as being publicly available. The Office should also consider providing guidance on the "economic" issue in terms of high priced materials that are potentially available to anyone in the public, but only at prices that are significantly above the current costs of getting republications of articles or buying books that might range from $1--$100. For example, if an analyst report on a given industry is prior art in terms of its publication date, but the cost of that report is $1000 or more in order to obtain access, will that kind of a document be considered by the Office to be "publicly available." H. Concerns about Piecemeal Use of Prior Art -MIPLA is concerned about what appears to be guidance for the use of piecemeal rejections based on prior art. The proposed Examination Guidelines with respect to AIA Section 102(b) subparagraphs (B) each includes a paragraph on how only insubtantial or trivial differences in the prior art and the subject matter disclosed by, for or from the inventor to "trigger" the FTP Grace Period Exception can preclude the exception from applying. "Even if the only differences between the subject matter in the prior art disclosure being relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure ..." See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. at 43767, col. 2. MIPLA notes that the language used in these sentence on the applicability of the FTP Grace Period Exception, at a minimum, needs to be reviewed and cleaned up to prevent what is assumed to be an unintended interpretation of the language that "the only differences ... being relied upon" is instructing examiners to consider the prior art in a piecemeal fashion, rather than considering the prior art as a whole. I. Guidelines for "On Sale" Actitivities: In response to the Office's request for comment on the extent to which public availability plays a role with respect to "on sale" prior art defined in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1), MIPLA believes that an offer for sale needs to be "public available" in order to qualify as "on sale" prior art under AIA Section 102(a)(1). As noted in footnote 29 of the proposed Examination Guidelines, AIA Section 102(a)(1), unlike pre--AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b), contains the residual clause "or otherwise available to the public." Further, as noted in the footnote, the legislative history of the AIA indicates that the inclusion of this clause in AIA Section 102(a)(1) should be viewed as indicating that AIA Section 102(a)(1) does not cover non--public uses or non--public offers for sale, and that the effect of adding the words 'or otherwise available to the public' is confirmed by judicial construction of this phraseology where the courts have consistently found that when the words or otherwise' or or other' when used as a modifier at the end of a string of clauses restricts the meaning of the preceding clauses. MIPLA recognizes that adopting this interpretation for "on sale" will create some uncertainties for certain fact patterns, such as whether or not public sale of a product produced by a secret process makes that process publicly available and whether changes in technology can at some point make what had been a secret process no longer a secret process because that process has become publicly available as a result of new technology that can enable public reverse engineering of the process from the product that is "on sale". Accordingly, MIPLA encourages the Office to provide guidance for the interpretation in these kinds of situations based on whether "reverse engineering" does or does not make an otherwise secret process "publicly available," and on how the Office expects to handle situations where the techniques for "reverse engineering" evolve and a secret process is no longer secret based on the new technique to reverse engineer the process from the product that is "on sale. (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. 5 Accordingly, under New Section 102(a)(1) novelty destroying prior art exists if a disclosure of the claimed invention was publicly accessible anywhere in the world before the effective filing date. Under New Section 102, novelty destroying prior art exists if the claimed invention was described in an earlier-filed, non-public U.S./U.S. PCT patent application of another inventor that is later published.
These changes represent major changes to U.S. patent law, and have been characterized as attempts to more closely align U.S. patent law with the absolute novelty requirement that is 4 used by virtually all other countries around the world. 6 However, the AIA does not bring U.S.
Patent law in complete conformance with the absolute novelty requirement. (1) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION. -A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if -(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such [grace period public] disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.
(2) DISCLOSURES APPEARING IN APPLICATIONS AND PATENTS. -A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2) if -(A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed by the inventor or joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor, or (C) the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.
Generally, these exceptions, often referred to as the First-To-Publish (FTP) Grace Period 6 Peterson & Woo, page 4. 7 See id. at 1 (Director Kappos stating that rather than focusing on pure harmonization the new AIA "must be rooted in global best policies and practices-basic principals we agree define a 21 st century patent system that maximally accelerates technological progress"). For decades, efforts at U.S. leadership on creating more globally harmonized patent laws have been stymied because the majority of the U.S. patent community had no interest in seeing our patentability standards and criteria exported globally. When U.S. interests defined the "best practices" internationally for crafting a patent law and patent system, those practices were in key respects absent in our laws. The AIA has ended that era of followership for the United States. The supporters of the AIA look at its provisions as the epitome of best patenting practices.
Id.
Exceptions, permit the inventor a grace period where he may public disclose the invention without destroying patentability. New Section 102(b)(1) applies to Section 102(a)(1) prior art and has two separate exceptions, while New Section 102(b)(2) applies to Section 102(a)(2) prior art and has three exceptions. New Section 102(b)(1)'s two exceptions provide that: (A) a public disclosure of the inventor's own work will not be deemed prior art, as long as the disclosure did not occur more than 1-year prior to filing; and (B) any subsequent disclosure by a third-party based on a previous public disclosure of the inventor's own work will not be deemed prior art, as long as the subsequent disclosure pertains to the same subject matter disclosed previously. New Section 102(b)(2)'s three exceptions provide essentially the same exceptions for subsections (A) and (B) , as well as an exception (C) that a public disclosure by the inventor's co-workers and research collaborators will not be deemed prior art, as long as the disclosure did not occur more than 1-year prior to filing.
It is the Patent Office's interpretation of what qualifies as the same "subject matter disclosed" previously under the New Section 102(b) subparagraphs (B) that is of concern. The Office has interpreted the statute in very narrowly, such that if the third-party changes the subject matter disclosed from what the inventor had previously disclosed, even if those changes merely are "insubstantial" or "trivial" variations or changes, that subsequent third-party disclosure could be used as prior art against the inventor. Most practitioners would interpret subparagraphs (B) more broadly to mean that if an inventor publically discloses their invention, then subsequent publications cannot be used against the inventor to defeat patentability. Thus, early public disclosure inoculates an inventor against subsequent disclosures by third-parties.
Besides majority support, there is evidence that Congress intended subsections (B) to be interpreted broadly. In fact, Senator Kyl (R-AZ) stated that "under new section 102(b)(1) (B) , once the U.S. inventor discloses his invention, no subsequent prior art can defeat the invention." 10 However, under the Office's Proposed Rules, this would not be the case.
For illustration, imagine that an independent inventor and small business owner conceives of an idea. She thinks it is a pretty good idea, but is not sure if it is marketable so she publically discloses the idea on her website to see if it attracts any interest (discloses A+B+C).
The idea catches on and seems like it may be profitable, so within 1-year of the public disclosure she files a patent (claiming A+B). However, before she filed her patent application a third-party copied portions of her disclosure and also added to it, posting the new disclosure on their website (disclosing A+B+C+D). During prosecution the Examiner sees both publications and rejects all claims as anticipated under New Section 102(a). The inventor can overcome her own disclosure according to the New Section 102(b)(1)(A) exception, but under the Proposed Rules for New Section 102(b)(1)(B) she cannot overcome the third-party disclosure rejection because it contains at least "insubstantial" or "trivial" variations from her own publication.
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The same outcome occurs when the third-party under discloses what had previously been disclosed by the inventor. In other words, if the inventor discloses A+B+C, and a third-party subsequently discloses A+B, the third-party disclosure would be prior art under New Section 102(a), and no exception would apply under New Section 102(b)(1) (B) as interpreted by the Proposed Rules.
Thus, if the Proposed Rules are adopted by the Patent Office, both a subsequent overdisclosure and an under-disclosure by a third-party of an inventor's publication could serve as a bar to patentability.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
While there are many different ways in which variations on the words "disclose" and "describe" are used throughout the AIA and within New Section 102.
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The Proposed 11 New Section 102 of the AIA is reproduced below with some editorial insertions and emphasis added to highlight and clarify any variations on the words "disclose" and "describe" used in this section in order to better frame the discussion on the statutory interpretation of the FTP Grace Period Exceptions: § 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty.
(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART. -A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. (A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such [grace period patent filing] subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2) [as determined pursuant to section (d)], been publicly disclosed by the inventor or joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor, or (C) the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person. (c) COMMON OWNERSHIP UNDER JOINT RESEARCH AGREEMENTS. -Subject matter disclosed and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person in applying the provisions of subsection (b)(2)(C) if -(1) the subject matter disclosed was developed and the claimed invention was made by, or on behalf of, 1 or more parties to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the effective filing date of the claimed invention;
(2) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement; and (3) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement. (d) PATENTS AND PUBLISHED APPLICATIONS EFFECTIVE AS PRIOR ART. -For purposes of determining whether a patent or application is prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2), such patent or application shall be considered to have been effectively filed, with respect to any subject matter described in the patent or application -
(1) if paragraph (2) does not apply, as of the actual filing date of the patent or the application for patent; or (2) if the patent or application for patent is entitled to claim a right of priority under section 119, 365(a), or 365(b), or to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under section 120, 121 or 365(c), based upon 1 or more prior filed applications for patent, as of the filing date of the earliest of such application that describes the subject matter.
Guidelines take the approach of "treating the term 'disclosure' [as used in New Sections The exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) applies if the " 'subject matter' disclosed [in the prior art disclosure] had, before such [prior art] disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor * * * ." Thus, the exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1) (B) requires that the subject matter in the prior disclosure being relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) be the same "subject matter" as the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure for the exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) to apply. Even if the only differences between the subject matter in the prior art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial or obvious variations, the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) does not apply. We now divide this section into three parts to highlight three separate errors in statutory analysis that result in the Proposed Guidelines getting it wrong in proposing a "narrow" view of the FTP Grace Period Exceptions for third-party related matters under the New Section 102(b) subparagraphs (B) . The first error relates to the focus on interpreting just the phrase "subject matter," instead of recognizing that it is the entire phrase "subject matter disclosed" that must be construed. The second error relates to the consequences of improperly focusing on just the "differences" between the disclosure triggering the exception and the prior art that might be subject to the exception. The third error relates to the improper creation of a new "narrow" standard that is so narrow that it renders the FTP exceptions for third party-related materials effectively meaningless.
A. First Construction Error-Inconsistent Phrase Construction
It appears that the first error arises out of an incorrect assumption that the term "disclosed" in subparagraphs (B) can be construed separately from the terms "subject matter." This is illustrated by the Office's comments that:
[T]he exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1) (B) requires that the subject matter in the prior disclosure being relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) be the same "subject matter" as the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure for the exception in 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) to apply. A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under [subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2)] if … the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. related materials (i.e., how was the initial disclosure made), the answer does not need to be found in the phrase "subject matter disclosed" in subparagraphs (B) , as that requires separation of the term "subject matter" from the term "disclosed." Rather, the answer to the "how" question can be found in the phrase "publicly disclosed." Accordingly, there is no need to interpret the term "disclosed" as somehow being separate from the terms "subject matter," such that the word "disclosed" would need to be interpreted as a variation of the words "disclose" or "describe" that are used in New Section 102(a).
The correct approach to interpreting New Section 102(b) is to start by presuming that where one section uses different words or phrases than another section Congress must have intended the words or phrases to have different meanings.
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Using such an approach to statutory construction is particularly important in this situation where the specific phrase "subject matter disclosed" is a phrase that is wholly unique to New Sections 102(b) and 102(c). The specific phrase "subject matter disclosed" is used nine (9) different times in these two sections, but this specific phrase is not used anywhere else in the AIA or in 35 U.S.C. As will be seen from the analysis and discussion that follows, in order for the phrase "subject matter disclosed" to be understood as referring to the same actions and/or things over the nine (9) different usages of this same specific phrase in New Sections 102(b) and (c), the phrase "subject matter disclosed" should be understood as referring to the conveyance of information about an invention before that invention has been fully described, enabled or claimed.
Inherent in this interpretation is the understanding that because this phrase encompasses a conveyance of information without the invention being fully described, enabled or claimed, the 13 "subject matter disclosed" is necessarily referencing information that may be amorphous and imprecise and that very likely will change and mature as the information about the invention is refined into a fully described, enabled and claimed invention. It is also important to note that the phrase "subject matter disclosed" is used in New Sections 102(b) and (c) to refer to conveyances of information about an invention that are both private (e.g., the conveyance of information about an invention by an inventor to someone else within a company who is directed to prepare and publicly release information about the invention or prepare and file a patent application for the invention), and public (e.g., the publication, public disclosure, patent filing that is later published or other ways of making of information about the invention publicly available).
To provide a context for why the phrase "subject matter disclosed" must be understood as suggested, and to better appreciate the challenges Congress had in codifying an understanding about an invention before that invention has been fully described, enabled or claimed, it is helpful to graphically present a set of simplified diagram of the invention process by which ideas are turned into real embodiments of an invention. The figure below outlines the various steps that can occur in what will be referred to as the Continuums of Invention.
The Continuums of Invention start when ideas about an invention are formed or conceived, a part of the process that has come to be known as the "conception" of an invention. 16 After this, the process can diverge into different paths that may or may not involve further development, refinements and testing of the invention (i.e. "experimentation"). Sometimes, there may be actual building or conducting of examples of the invention in a part of the process referred to as "actual reduction to practice."
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Other times, the first reduction to practice is the preparation and filing of a patent application, a "constructive reduction to practice." 18 Before or after the filing of a patent application, information about the invention may also be made publicly available, for example by publication an academic paper or presentation of a video on a web site, in what will be referred to as a "description" of the invention. It should be noted that a patent application must have also a "written description" as part of the requirements of Section 112 as part of a necessary, but not sufficient conditions for patentability. To be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 112 a patent application must also convey enough information about the invention to permit a person skilled in the art to make and practice that invention, what is referred to as the legal requirement of enablement.
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For purposes of patenting an invention, the invention must be "claimed" in that a patent application must include at least one claim that sets forth the legal metes and bounds of the invention. 20 And, before or after a claimed invention has been prosecuted and issued as a patent, there may or may not be actual real world embodiments of the invention that are made, used or sold, which are shown in the Continuums of Invention as "embodiments" representing the final part of the process. It can be seen that for any given invention, the actual path along the Continuums of Invention can only be determined by a post hoc analysis. Just like deciding whether a given real world embodiment does or does not infringe an issued and valid patent claim is a determination that can only be made after the patent has been issued and after the particular embodiment of the method or apparatus has been made, used or sold.
Thus, the Continuums of Invention diagram illustrates why the two occurrences of the phrase "subject matter disclosed" in the context of the FTP Grace Period Exceptions of subparagraphs (B) of New Section 102(b) must be interpreted as referring to a conveyance of information somewhere in the middle of the Continuums of Invention. The proper interpretation of the phrase "subject matter disclosed" is not at the extreme of a specific embodiment of the information.
The Continuums of Invention diagram also illustrates why an asymmetric interpretation of the phrase "subject matter disclosed," that is applied only with respect the FTP Grace Period Exceptions of New Section 102(b) subparagraphs (B) , results in an inconsistent and improper construction of the statute. Under New Section 102(b) subparagraphs (A), there are two ways in which the grace period public disclosure can be triggered: (i) if public disclosure is "made by the inventor or joint inventor," or (ii) if public disclosure is made "by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor." Thus, we see that the phrase "subject matter disclosed" in used in each of the New Section 102(b) subparagraphs (A) providesthe context of how an inventor can internally convey information to others who then trigger the FTP Grace Period Exception. This same "internally conveyed" context in which an inventor conveys information to another not an inventor who then publicly discloses some version of that information can also be found in the four occurrences of the phrase "subject matter disclosed" throughout New Sections 102(b) subparagraphs (B) .
If the "narrow" interpretation set forth in the Proposed Guidelines is used in any of these "internally conveyed" contexts, the result is plainly not what Congress intended. Assume, for example, that the information representing the subject matter is conveyed from an inventor to an editor who then refines and revises an article for publication. These changes by the editor are almost certain to add some "insubstantial changes" to the information conveyed from the inventor. 21 This would mean that the exception for the inventor's own work would not apply whenever the content of the subject matter was changed even by an insubstantial amount by the person who, with authority from the inventor, receives, revises and then publishes that information.
Another example of why a "narrow" interpretation used in an "internally conveyed" context does not operate in a manner that Congress intended occurs in a situation involving the further refinement of the subject matter conveyed from an inventor by a non-inventor who assists in the actual reduction to practice of the invention. Case law is clear that such assistance in the actual reduction to practice is something that may need to happen. If that assistance does not rise to the level of a patentable contribution to the initial conception of the invention, then the individuals who are assisting in the actual reduction to practice are not deemed to be inventors, even though they are almost certain to make "insubstantial changes" to the subject matter information about the invention that was conveyed to them. attorney for purposes of preparing a patent application for that invention. Where the invention
has not yet been reduced to practice, the filing of the patent application is referred to as a constructive reduction to practice. Again, the patent attorney is almost certain to make "insubstantial changes" to the information that represents the subject matter for the invention as part of the preparation of the patent application. 23 So, if the "narrow" interpretation of "subject matter disclosed" is used, the essential process of formalizing the subject matter of an invention as part of preparation of a patent application would most likely cause the inventor to lose the benefit of any exceptions for the inventor's own work with respect to other patent filings that end up being published.
The remaining three occurrences of the phrase "subject matter disclosed" occur in the context of determining the timing of when an invention is "developed" for purposes of determining whether the so-called "team" exceptions of New Section 102(b)(2)(C) for inventions subject to a common obligation of assignment and New Section 102(c) with respect to Joint Research Agreements. And, again, none of these occurrences of the phrase "subject matter disclosed" used in the context of the "team" exceptions would operate as intended if a narrow construction of this phrase is adopted.
As shown in the figure below, the proper interpretation of the phrase "subject matter disclosed" must occur along the Continuums of Invention someplace after some or all of conception, experimentation and reduction to practice that happen for an invention, and someplace before the description, enablement, claims and specific embodiments of the invention are formalized in a patent application or public disclosure. 23 Find cite.
B. Second Construction Error -Improper Focus on Only the "Differences"
As part of the "narrow" construction accorded the FTP Grace Period Exception for third party-related materials, the Proposed Guidelines set forth a standard that looks only to differences in the prior art versus the triggering disclosure. This is illustrated by the Office's comments that:
Even if the only differences between the subject matter in the prior art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure [are merely insubstantial or trivial, then the exception does not apply].
24
This proposed standard would require that the statutory language be amenable to interpretation such that each of the "subject matter disclosed" and the "[grace period public] disclosure" or the "[grace period patent filing] disclosure" of New Section 102 can be analyzed in pieces, instead of being analyzed as a whole. evaluating whether to invoke the FTP Grace Period Exception for third party-related materials.
Moreover, if the proposed standard is susceptible to a piece-meal evaluation, then the proposed standard is also vague in that it is unclear whether the exception is being applied to only the differences or to the entire grace period disclosure by a third party.
A standard that focuses solely on express differences ignores a well-established body of case law with respect to inherent disclosures. 26 The trivial or insubstantial differences in the express disclosures of a prior art disclosure versus the triggering disclosure may, in fact, be inherently disclosed. In these situations, a strict application of the proposed "narrow" standard would run counter to the doctrine of inherent disclosure. Under the doctrine of inherent disclosure, an earlier reference may anticipate a later reference even though it may not disclose a particular characteristic expressly disclosed in the later reference, provided that the missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent in the anticipating reference. 27 Thus, it is a realistic possibility that under the narrow interpretation presented by the Proposed Rules, a later publication by a third party could defeat patentability by publically disclosing something that was inherently-but not expressly-present in a earlier disclosure.
While Congress gave the Office limited rulemaking authority in the context of implementing the new Review Proceedings, 28 there was no provision for providing the Office with substantive rulemaking authority for implementing the FITF provisions of the AIA.
Because the proposed "narrow" standard creates an entirely new standard that is not found in any current case law, it appears that the Office has exceeded its procedural rule making authority in proposing the "narrow" standard. 
C. Third Construction Error-A "Narrow" Standard Renders Third-Party FTP Exceptions Superfluous
The new "narrow" standard found in the Proposed Guidelines would be so narrow that it would render the FTP exceptions for third party-related materials effectively meaningless.
Specifically, here we are referring to the Office's comments that:
Even if the only differences between the subject matter in the prior art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and the subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial or obvious variations, the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) does not apply.
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It is acknowledged even by those supporting the narrow standard found in the Proposed Guidelines that the chances of having an independent third-party disclosure that would have not "trivial" or "insubstantial differences" from the subject matter publicly disclosed by or for an inventor are so small as to represent a practical impossible fact pattern. Consequently, the only FTP Grace Period Exception in cases of intervening prior art that is close to, but not exactly identical to, subject matter disclosed by or for the inventor in order to have any ability to argue that the differences are merely obvious variations that are somehow based on the inventor's work, and that the intervening prior art should be excluded.
It is a tenant of statutory construction that an interpretation of a statute should not render superfluous any of the provisions of that statute. 35 If the "narrow" standard for evaluating the FTP Grace Period Exceptions for third party materials is finally adopted, there would be no ability to any inventors to effectively use the FTP Grace Period Exceptions for third-party related materials as found in New Section 102(b) subparagraphs (B) .
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS
In addition to the statutory construction problems with the "narrow" standard for FTP Grace Period Exceptions for third party-related materials, there are also several important policy 22 reasons for why the adoption of the proposed standard is a bad idea. At the highest level for the U.S. Patent System as a whole, the impact of the "narrow" standard can be seen as cutting against the recognized AIA policy of encouraging early disclosure of new inventions. 36 On a more individual level, the effect on both patent applicants and patent examiners will be burdensome and difficult to manage. Without a doubt, the optimum patent filing strategy is always to file for patent protection before there is any public disclosure of subject matter for an invention. For larger companies and more experienced entrepreneurs, it is expected that these players will respond to the AIA by operating as if the new FITF provisions create a de facto First-To-File patent system in the United States. For smaller companies, universities and individual inventors who are new to the patent system, that kind of rigorous approach is simply not feasible and it is very likely that these players will be tripped up by the new FITF provisions with the proposed "narrow" FTP Grace Period Exception for third party-related materials. And for those patent applicants who do try to utilize the FTP Grace Period Exceptions, there will be tremendous extra effort and expense needed to preserve evidence for possible derivation proceedings, take extra efforts to police disclosures made before patent filings can be put in place, and rework disclosure to expand them so as to cover as many insubstantial, trivial or obvious variations as possible. For examiners and the Office, the strong incentives created by the asymmetry between the FTP Grace Period Exceptions for an inventor's own materials versus third party-related materials will result in a significant increase in the use of derivation petitions by patent applicants faced with intervening prior art of third parties. Given the already massive workloads faced by the new Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), adoption of the "narrow" construction in the Proposed Guidelines may overwhelm the system with derivation petition filings that would be orders of magnitude above the numbers currently projected. Congress has confirmed the bright line rule of 1-year in the public domain as being the absolute upper limit to any exceptions to the new FITF patent system under the New 102(b).
Existing case law has been built around the statutory framework of Old 102(b) that provides for a 1-year complete grace period for public disclosures. Even the inventor's own earlier disclosures could serve as inherent disclosures that anticipate a subsequent patent application by the inventor directed to that which was inherent in the earlier disclosure, but only if the subject matter inherently disclosed was in the public domain for more than the 1-year complete grace period. 37 However, unlike the current automatic and fixed 1-year grace period of Old Section 102(b), the First-To-Publish Grace Period Exceptions under the FITF provisions of the AIA are conditional in application and variable in length. In order to be invoked, the FTP Grace Period Exception must be triggered by a "disclosure" that is public in the sense acts/things that are considered publicly available for purposes of New Section 102(a). And, once the FTP Grace Period has been triggered, it is not an unlimited grace period; rather the FTP Grace Period can be no longer, and in many situation will be less than, a maximum 1-year period from the first public disclosure triggering the FTP Grace Period and the effective filing date of the patent application under consideration. That first triggering public disclosure can be either a public disclosure of or based on the inventor's own work (under New Section 102(b)(1)), or a publication of or based on the inventor's own patent filing (under New Section 102(b)(2)).
Contrary to the concerns expressed by some commentators, the choice of whether to interpret the FTP Grace Period Exceptions narrowly or broadly will never turn the FITF provisions of the AIA into a de facto "first-to-publish" patent system. If a patent applicant is first to publish, but that triggering publication event occurs earlier than the 1-year maximum grace period before the effective filing date of the patent application under consideration, then 37 In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405-06 (CCPA 1969).
